Why Ukraine may be involved in Mali's conflict

Ukraine is fighting Russia — and the conflict may extend into Africa's Sahel region.

According to an investigation published by US media outlet CNN in September, around 15 Ukrainian drone specialists are reportedly supporting Tuareg rebels in northern Mali. Their common enemy: the military government in Bamako and its Russian allies.

But how reliable is the information? And what price could Kyiv pay for engaging in Africa?

Marta Oliynyk-D'omochko, coordinator of the African Studies Program at the National University of Kyiv-Mohyla Academy, sees a strategic motive. "Ukraine's main interest is to weaken Russia's influence around the world," she told DW. If Russia's military influence were rolled back, she added, the economic opportunities arising from it would also diminish.

Russian historian Irina Filatova, professor emeritus at the University of KwaZulu-Natal in South Africa, also considers Ukrainian support for the Tuareg movement plausible. However, she said she has no independent evidence to confirm such involvement.

Kyiv's alleged partners are controversial. The Tuareg separatist Azawad Liberation Front (FLA) cooperates with the Jama'at Nusrat al-Islam wal Muslimeen (JNIM), a jihadist group affiliated with al-Qaeda.

Suspicions dating back to 2024

In July 2024, DW reported on possible involvement by the Ukrainian military intelligence service (HUR) in an ambush on Russian Wagner fighters near Tinzaouaten in northern Mali.

At the time, HUR spokesperson Andriy Yusov said the Tuareg rebels had received information they needed to carry out the attack. Ukraine denied direct involvement.

Jihadist groups in Africa and their links

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Paramilitaries from Russia's Wagner Group and Malian troops suffered heavy losses in the July 2024 attack. 

CNN's investigation has reignited the question of whether the Russia-Ukraine war is also being fought on African soil.

Signals from Kyiv, but no confirmation

The suspicions were renewed by a post on X by Kyrylo Budanov. The former head of Ukraine's military intelligence, now chief of staff to President Volodymyr Zelenskyy, wrote on September 7 that Ukrainian intelligence protects the country's interests worldwide — "from Russia to Africa … in the burning desert sands and in the snows of icy Antarctica...".

Budanov did not explicitly mention Mali and his post does not confirm any specific operation. CNN reported that the Ukrainians provided drone training, operational planning and remote support for drone missions. DW has not independently verified those claims.

DW reached out to the HUR for comment. Among other things, DW wanted to know whether personnel had been deployed to Mali, whether the political leadership had approved such a mission, and what measures were in place to ensure that the JNIM — which cooperates with the FLA — does not indirectly benefit from Ukrainian support.

DW did not receive a specific response. An HUR spokesperson said the agency might provide information at a later date. The extent of any potential Ukrainian involvement therefore remains unclear.

Why Mali matters to Kyiv

Following military coups in 2020 and 2021, Mali increasingly turned away from Western partners and toward Russia. The Wagner Group was subsequently replaced by the Africa Corps in 2025 as Moscow reorganized its military presence.

Russia has sought to consolidate its influence in the Sahel region and present itself as a reliable security partner.

Ulf Laessing, former head of the Sahel program of the Konrad Adenauer Foundation in Mali and now head of its Syria and Iraq program, said Russia is continuing to expand its activities in Africa.

"I have received information that the Africa Corps still uses Syria and Libya as transit points for flights from Russia, including for refueling and loading, to support its operations on the continent," Laessing told DW.

How could Wagner Group revolt impact Africa?

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From Ukraine's perspective, it could be attractive to exert pressure on Russian forces in Africa.

Filatova sees a strategic logic to this: "The Ukrainians regard Russian troops anywhere in the world as legitimate targets." Setbacks in Mali could tie up Russian resources and undermine Moscow's reputation as a security partner, she argued.

However, Oliynyk-D'omochko stressed that the relationship with the Tuareg is not a comprehensive alliance. The FLA is not seeking to replace the government in Bamako. Instead, it is focused on northern Mali and is pursuing self-determination or extensive autonomy.

Oliynyk-D'omochko describes the relationship as a tactical arrangement: "It is more of a situational alliance against a common enemy than a comprehensive partnership."

The alliance with jihadists

The FLA is fighting for an independent state in the north of Mali, a region predominantly inhabited by Tuaregs. JNIM, by contrast, aims to impose strict Islamic rule. Both groups oppose the military government and its Russian allies, but their objectives differ.

Any potential Ukrainian support for the FLA would not, in itself, prove that Kyiv is directly supporting JNIM. However, jihadists could benefit indirectly if they conduct joint operations with FLA or gain access to knowledge and equipment.

Cooperation between Tuareg and Islamist groups dates back more than a decade.

After the ousting and killing of Libya's longtime dictator Muammar al-Gaddafi during the Arab Spring in October 2011, heavily armed Tuareg fighters returned to Mali and took up the struggle for an independent state.

In the process, separatist ambitions became intertwined with Islamist movements. Iyad Ag Ghaly, the current leader of JNIM, was himself involved in the Tuareg rebellion before turning to jihadism.

According to Oliynyk-D'omochko, the cooperation is primarily tactical in nature. The two sides have collaborated during past uprisings but later fell out. It remains unclear how long the current alliance will last.

For Kyiv, this also poses a political risk. In many African countries, the Tuaregs are viewed as separatists. Cooperation with them could therefore create the impression that Ukraine is interfering in another country's internal affairs.

Claims of support for armed groups

Mali, Niger and Burkina Faso accuse Ukraine of supporting armed groups and threatening their territorial integrity. The three Sahel nations, all ruled by military governments, have severed diplomatic relations with Kyiv and deepened their cooperation with Russia.

In September, Mali's Foreign Minister Abdoulaye Diop accused Ukraine at the United Nations of "providing clear and open support to terrorist groups and other mafia-like groups to undermine our country's territorial integrity," reported Agence France-Presse. Diop did not provide evidence for his claim.

The three nations' governments have may have an interest in legitimizing their partnership with Moscow and portraying Kyiv as a destabilizing actor.

Oliynyk-D'omochko has found no definitive proof of the allegations, yet warned of the potential consequences for Ukraine's Africa policy. Kyiv advocates equal partnerships with African countries. Any alleged cooperation with separatists could undermine that message and affect how potential partners view Ukraine.

What price could Ukraine pay?

Engagement in Mali could offer Ukraine a relatively low-cost way to weaken Russian interests beyond Europe. A small team of specialists could train local fighters and improve their capabilities in the use of drones.

But a potential partnership with the FLA carries political risks. Because the Tuareg separatists cooperate with the JNIM, Kyiv could face accusations of indirectly supporting jihadist fighters. That could undermine Ukraine's efforts to strengthen its relations with African countries.

How Mali's big bet on Russia is backfiring

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This article has been translated from German

Correction, October 26, 2026: An earlier version of this article stated that the CNN investigation was published in October 2026; the report was published in September. DW apologizes for the error.